Deferred Prosecution Agreements - Revision history

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	{{MetaDescription\|Learn about Deferred Prosecution Agreements's federal case, conviction, and prison experience on Prisonpedia.}}		{{MetaDescription\|Learn about Deferred Prosecution Agreements's federal case, conviction, and prison experience on Prisonpedia.}}
	'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) (and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements~~, or~~ NPAs) are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and ~~defendants (individuals~~ or, far more commonly, corporations~~) under which~~ the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the ~~defendant’s~~ compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. ~~Although not~~ explicitly authorized by statute, ~~DPAs are grounded in~~ the ~~government’s~~ broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial ~~Act’s~~ exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They ~~are~~ governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and defendants—individuals or, far more commonly, corporations. Under these agreements, the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the defendant's compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. DPAs aren't explicitly authorized by statute, but they rest on the government's broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial Act's exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They're governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>
	Between 2015 and November 2025, the DOJ entered into more than 420 corporate DPAs/NPAs, collecting over $72 billion in monetary penalties and restitution — roughly 38% of all corporate criminal resolutions during that period.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> For individuals, DPAs remain relatively rare ~~but have~~ increased dramatically since 2022 in FCPA, health-care fraud, and national-security cases.
	DPAs ~~allow~~ prosecutors to secure significant penalties, compliance reforms, and cooperation without the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction (e.g.~~, debarment,~~ loss of licenses~~, or~~ shareholder suits~~), while preserving~~ the ability to prosecute if the defendant breaches.		The numbers tell a striking story. Between 2015 and November 2025, the DOJ entered into more than 420 corporate DPAs/NPAs, collecting over $72 billion in monetary penalties and restitution. That's roughly 38% of all corporate criminal resolutions during that period.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> For individuals, DPAs remain relatively rare. But they've increased dramatically since 2022 in FCPA, health-care fraud, and national-security cases.

			Why use them? DPAs let prosecutors secure significant penalties, compliance reforms, and cooperation without the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. No debarment. No loss of licenses. No shareholder suits. The government still preserves the ability to prosecute if the defendant breaches.

	==Key Features of a Federal DPA==		==Key Features of a Federal DPA==
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	\|}		\|}

	NPAs ~~are~~ functionally ~~identical except~~ no charges are ever filed publicly ~~(often~~ used when the company has already self-disclosed early and ~~has~~ an exemplary compliance program).		NPAs work the same way functionally. The main difference: no charges are ever filed publicly. They're used when the company has already self-disclosed early and maintains an exemplary compliance program.

	==Typical DPA Timeline (Corporate Example)==		==Typical DPA Timeline (Corporate Example)==

	~~The typical progression of a~~ corporate DPA ~~includes the following stages~~:		A corporate DPA follows a fairly predictable path:

	1. Self-disclosure or detection by DOJ		1. Self-disclosure or detection by DOJ
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	4. Execution and public announcement of DPA (charges filed, often unsealed same day)		4. Execution and public announcement of DPA (charges filed, often unsealed same day)
	5. Monitorship or self-reporting period (18–36 months average)		5. Monitorship or self-reporting period (18–36 months average)
	6. Final certification of compliance → charges dismissed		6. Final certification of compliance then charges dismissed

	==Individual DPAs (Pretrial Diversion for Adults)==		==Individual DPAs (Pretrial Diversion for Adults)==

	Since 2022, DOJ ~~has~~ formalized pretrial diversion for individuals via DPAs in appropriate cases (Justice Manual § 9-28.1300, added March 2023). ~~Criteria include:~~		Since 2022, the DOJ formalized pretrial diversion for individuals via DPAs in appropriate cases. This came from Justice Manual § 9-28.1300, added March 2023. Who qualifies?

	* No prior felony convictions		* No prior felony convictions
	* Offense is non-violent		* Offense is non-violent
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	* Strong public interest in rehabilitation over prosecution		* Strong public interest in rehabilitation over prosecution

	As of mid-2025, approximately 1,850 individuals have resolved federal cases ~~via~~ pretrial DPAs ~~— primarily~~ health-care fraud, bank fraud, and false-statements cases.<ref>{{cite web \|title=DOJ Pretrial Diversion Statistics 2025 \|url=https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-2025-diversion-statistics \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=June 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		As of mid-2025, approximately 1,850 individuals have resolved federal cases through pretrial DPAs. Most were health-care fraud, bank fraud, and false-statements cases.<ref>{{cite web \|title=DOJ Pretrial Diversion Statistics 2025 \|url=https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-2025-diversion-statistics \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=June 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> Individual DPAs usually last 12–24 months and require community service, restitution, and compliance conditions.
	Individual DPAs usually last 12–24 months and require community service, restitution, and compliance conditions.

	==Monetary Resolutions (2018–2025 largest DPAs)==		==Monetary Resolutions (2018–2025 largest DPAs)==
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	==Criticisms and Reform Efforts==		==Criticisms and Reform Efforts==

	Critics ~~argue DPAs:~~		Not everyone likes DPAs. Critics contend that they allow "too big to fail" companies to buy their way out of convictions, impose multi-year monitorships at enormous cost (often $2 to $50 million per case) borne ultimately by shareholders, and lack judicial oversight. Judges review them only for propriety, not substance.
	* Allow “too big to ~~fail”~~ companies to buy their way out of convictions
	* Impose multi-year monitorships at enormous cost ($2–$50 million) ultimately ~~borne~~ by shareholders
	* Lack judicial oversight ~~(judges~~ review only for propriety, not substance)

	The Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (2023) and 2025 Monaco Memo amendments now require:		Recent reforms push back on these concerns. The Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (2023) and 2025 Monaco Memo amendments now require:
	* Claw-back of executive compensation tied to misconduct		* Claw-back of executive compensation tied to misconduct
	* Mandatory individual accountability plans in every corporate resolution		* Mandatory individual accountability plans in every corporate resolution
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	==Recent Developments (2024–2025)==		==Recent Developments (2024–2025)==

	* DOJ’s January 2025 policy now presumes DPAs will include admissions of criminal conduct (ending ~~“neither~~ admit nor ~~deny”~~ language in most cases)<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		Change is coming fast. In January 2025, the DOJ's policy now presumes DPAs will include admissions of criminal conduct. That's ending the old "neither admit nor deny" language in most cases.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> There's also a pilot program (SDNY & NDCA) that requires companies to implement compliance-focused whistleblower protections to qualify for DPA credit. And Binance's March 2025 DPA marked the first-ever agreement with a cryptocurrency exchange, complete with a three-year monitorship and $4.3 billion penalty.
	* Pilot program (SDNY & NDCA) requires companies to implement compliance-focused whistleblower protections to qualify for DPA credit
	* First-ever ~~DPA~~ with a cryptocurrency exchange ~~(Binance~~, ~~March 2025) included~~ a three-year monitorship and $4.3 billion penalty

	==See also==		==See also==

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	== Nightmare Success Guides ==		== Nightmare Success Guides ==
	* [https://nightmaresuccess.com/guides/white-collar-cases-common-triggers-and-early-mistakes/ White-Collar Cases: Common Triggers and Early Mistakes] — Common escalation patterns and the early-stage discipline that limits damage.		* [https://nightmaresuccess.com/guides/white-collar-cases-common-triggers-and-early-mistakes/ White-Collar Cases: Common Triggers and Early Mistakes] — Common escalation patterns and the early-stage discipline that limits damage.

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	{{MetaDescription\|Learn about Deferred Prosecution Agreements's federal case, conviction, and prison experience on Prisonpedia.}}		{{MetaDescription\|Learn about Deferred Prosecution Agreements's federal case, conviction, and prison experience on Prisonpedia.}}
	'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) (and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements, or NPAs) are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and defendants (individuals or, far more commonly, corporations) under which the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the defendant’s compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. Although not explicitly authorized by statute, DPAs are grounded in the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They are governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) (and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements, or NPAs) are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and defendants (individuals or, far more commonly, corporations) under which the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the defendant’s compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. Although not explicitly authorized by statute, DPAs are grounded in the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They are governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>
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	Between 2015 and November 2025, the DOJ entered into more than 420 corporate DPAs/NPAs, collecting over $72 billion in monetary penalties and restitution — roughly 38% of all corporate criminal resolutions during that period.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> For individuals, DPAs remain relatively rare but have increased dramatically since 2022 in FCPA, health-care fraud, and national-security cases.		Between 2015 and November 2025, the DOJ entered into more than 420 corporate DPAs/NPAs, collecting over $72 billion in monetary penalties and restitution — roughly 38% of all corporate criminal resolutions during that period.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> For individuals, DPAs remain relatively rare but have increased dramatically since 2022 in FCPA, health-care fraud, and national-security cases.
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	DPAs allow prosecutors to secure significant penalties, compliance reforms, and cooperation without the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction (e.g., debarment, loss of licenses, or shareholder suits), while preserving the ability to prosecute if the defendant breaches.		DPAs allow prosecutors to secure significant penalties, compliance reforms, and cooperation without the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction (e.g., debarment, loss of licenses, or shareholder suits), while preserving the ability to prosecute if the defendant breaches.

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	As of mid-2025, approximately 1,850 individuals have resolved federal cases via pretrial DPAs — primarily health-care fraud, bank fraud, and false-statements cases.<ref>{{cite web \|title=DOJ Pretrial Diversion Statistics 2025 \|url=https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-2025-diversion-statistics \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=June 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		As of mid-2025, approximately 1,850 individuals have resolved federal cases via pretrial DPAs — primarily health-care fraud, bank fraud, and false-statements cases.<ref>{{cite web \|title=DOJ Pretrial Diversion Statistics 2025 \|url=https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-2025-diversion-statistics \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=June 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>
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	Individual DPAs usually last 12–24 months and require community service, restitution, and compliance conditions.		Individual DPAs usually last 12–24 months and require community service, restitution, and compliance conditions.

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	* DOJ’s January 2025 policy now presumes DPAs will include admissions of criminal conduct (ending “neither admit nor deny” language in most cases)<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		* DOJ’s January 2025 policy now presumes DPAs will include admissions of criminal conduct (ending “neither admit nor deny” language in most cases)<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>
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	* Pilot program (SDNY & NDCA) requires companies to implement compliance-focused whistleblower protections to qualify for DPA credit		* Pilot program (SDNY & NDCA) requires companies to implement compliance-focused whistleblower protections to qualify for DPA credit
	* First-ever DPA with a cryptocurrency exchange (Binance, March 2025) included a three-year monitorship and $4.3 billion penalty		* First-ever DPA with a cryptocurrency exchange (Binance, March 2025) included a three-year monitorship and $4.3 billion penalty

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			== Nightmare Success Guides ==
			* [https://nightmaresuccess.com/guides/white-collar-cases-common-triggers-and-early-mistakes/ White-Collar Cases: Common Triggers and Early Mistakes] — Common escalation patterns and the early-stage discipline that limits damage.

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	{{MetaDescription\|Learn about Deferred Prosecution Agreements's federal case, conviction, and prison experience on Prisonpedia.}}		{{MetaDescription\|Learn about Deferred Prosecution Agreements's federal case, conviction, and prison experience on Prisonpedia.}}
	'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) (and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements, or NPAs) are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and defendants (individuals or, far more commonly, corporations) under which the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the defendant’s compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. Although not explicitly authorized by statute, DPAs are grounded in the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They are governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) (and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements, or NPAs) are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and defendants (individuals or, far more commonly, corporations) under which the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the defendant’s compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. Although not explicitly authorized by statute, DPAs are grounded in the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They are governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>
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	Between 2015 and November 2025, the DOJ entered into more than 420 corporate DPAs/NPAs, collecting over $72 billion in monetary penalties and restitution — roughly 38% of all corporate criminal resolutions during that period.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> For individuals, DPAs remain relatively rare but have increased dramatically since 2022 in FCPA, health-care fraud, and national-security cases.		Between 2015 and November 2025, the DOJ entered into more than 420 corporate DPAs/NPAs, collecting over $72 billion in monetary penalties and restitution — roughly 38% of all corporate criminal resolutions during that period.<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref> For individuals, DPAs remain relatively rare but have increased dramatically since 2022 in FCPA, health-care fraud, and national-security cases.
			\|title_mode=replace

	DPAs allow prosecutors to secure significant penalties, compliance reforms, and cooperation without the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction (e.g., debarment, loss of licenses, or shareholder suits), while preserving the ability to prosecute if the defendant breaches.		DPAs allow prosecutors to secure significant penalties, compliance reforms, and cooperation without the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction (e.g., debarment, loss of licenses, or shareholder suits), while preserving the ability to prosecute if the defendant breaches.
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	As of mid-2025, approximately 1,850 individuals have resolved federal cases via pretrial DPAs — primarily health-care fraud, bank fraud, and false-statements cases.<ref>{{cite web \|title=DOJ Pretrial Diversion Statistics 2025 \|url=https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-2025-diversion-statistics \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=June 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		As of mid-2025, approximately 1,850 individuals have resolved federal cases via pretrial DPAs — primarily health-care fraud, bank fraud, and false-statements cases.<ref>{{cite web \|title=DOJ Pretrial Diversion Statistics 2025 \|url=https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-releases-2025-diversion-statistics \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=June 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>
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	Individual DPAs usually last 12–24 months and require community service, restitution, and compliance conditions.		Individual DPAs usually last 12–24 months and require community service, restitution, and compliance conditions.
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	* DOJ’s January 2025 policy now presumes DPAs will include admissions of criminal conduct (ending “neither admit nor deny” language in most cases)<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		* DOJ’s January 2025 policy now presumes DPAs will include admissions of criminal conduct (ending “neither admit nor deny” language in most cases)<ref>{{cite web \|title=Corporate Resolutions 2024 Year-End Update \|url=https://www.gibsondunn.com/corporate-resolutions-2024-year-end-update/ \|publisher=Gibson Dunn \|date=March 24, 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>
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	* Pilot program (SDNY & NDCA) requires companies to implement compliance-focused whistleblower protections to qualify for DPA credit		* Pilot program (SDNY & NDCA) requires companies to implement compliance-focused whistleblower protections to qualify for DPA credit
	* First-ever DPA with a cryptocurrency exchange (Binance, March 2025) included a three-year monitorship and $4.3 billion penalty		* First-ever DPA with a cryptocurrency exchange (Binance, March 2025) included a three-year monitorship and $4.3 billion penalty

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			{{MetaDescription\|Learn about Deferred Prosecution Agreements's federal case, conviction, and prison experience on Prisonpedia.}}
	'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) (and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements, or NPAs) are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and defendants (individuals or, far more commonly, corporations) under which the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the defendant’s compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. Although not explicitly authorized by statute, DPAs are grounded in the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They are governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>		'''Deferred Prosecution Agreements''' (DPAs) (and their close cousins, Non-Prosecution Agreements, or NPAs) are contractual arrangements between federal prosecutors and defendants (individuals or, far more commonly, corporations) under which the government agrees to defer or forgo criminal charges in exchange for the defendant’s compliance with a negotiated set of conditions. Although not explicitly authorized by statute, DPAs are grounded in the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion and the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion of deferred periods (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). They are governed primarily by the Justice Manual §§ 9-28.000 et seq. and, for corporate cases, the detailed criteria in § 9-28.300 (Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations).<ref>{{cite web \|title=Justice Manual § 9-28.000 – Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations \|url=https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations \|publisher=U.S. Department of Justice \|date=October 2021, updated 2025 \|access-date=November 24, 2025}}</ref>

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-{{MetaDescription|Guide to federal deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). Learn about eligibility, conditions, and how DPAs work in white-collar cases.}}
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			{{MetaDescription\|Guide to federal deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). Learn about eligibility, conditions, and how DPAs work in white-collar cases.}}

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